

THE ANGLOPHONE CRISIS IN CAMEROON AND THE IMPERATIVE OF THE COHABITATION PACT BUILDING PEACE FROM THE “GREAT NATIONAL DIALOGUE”?



AUTHORS



Sintiche Nahomie Pagnou Tchinda is an independent consultant specialising in peace and security issues in the Great Lakes region in general and the Central African Republic in particular. She is also the author of numerous articles in the field of security and conflict management and of two essays, including « Gouvernance des ressources naturelles et la résurgence des conflits armés interne en Afrique Centrale : cas du Diamant dans les crises Centrafricaine (1996-2016) ». In 2020, she became the international consultant in Conflict Sensitivity in the framework of the « Mai-Ngo Ti A Masseka Project » for the socio-economic integration of young people and vocational training in Central African Republic, a project funded by ADF and implemented by a consortium team (IOM, MERCY CORPS, TGH). Sintiche Nahomie Pagnou Tchinda, with a Masters degree in Social Sciences and International Relations, specifically peace and development obtained in 2017 at the Protestant University of Central Africa in Yaoundé, Cameroon, became a consultant for the non-governmental organisation The Sentry in 2019 for the Investigation in conflict financing and corruption for the Central African Republic. In 2018, she joined the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) of the United Nations in New York as the Assistant political and social affairs officer. The portfolio entrusted to her included issues relating to peace and security: peacekeeping, peacebuilding, democratic governance in French-speaking countries.



With a Masters degree in International Studies, **Marcel ABANDA** is a consultant, analyst-editor in the field of international peace and security. As a project assistant (Consultant) in the field of research for peace, security, and peace support operations, he participates in the implementation of scientific activities and projects of the Research and Documentation Centre of the International School for Security Forces (EIFORCES). In the past, he was project attaché in charge of the Réseau d'expertise et de formation francophone pour les opérations de paix (REFFOP), within the framework of the Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Programme of the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie in Paris. He has also been called upon by various other research institutions in the field of peace and security (Institute of Security Studies via the Yaoundé Office of the ENACT Project) to conduct field research in Eastern Cameroon, as well as by the African Security Sector Network (ASSN), as part of the launch of its Think Tank African Societal Analysis (ASA) dedicated to the analysis of societal and security dynamics in relation to the development of African countries.



Pascal TOUOYEM, a doctorate/PhD holder from Universiteit van Tilburg, The Netherlands, is a Cameroonian philosopher/anthropologist. A Senior Research Director (DR1), Professor Pascal Touoyem sits on the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights as a Member-Expert for Central Africa, by Resolution 458 (LXVI) 2020 of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU). As a specialist in African political thought, he works to develop philosophical and geopolitical approaches to African international relations, peace & development studies, cultural & areas studies, human rights & intercultural epistemology, memory studies and NBIC (Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Neurobiology). In short, he works on cultural, socio-political, geo-strategic and cognitive processes through various editorial works, communications and scientific publications, supervision of work in African and Caribbean universities. Associate Researcher at SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Sweden and Chairperson, Steering Committee, Africa Security Sector Network Initiative for CSO WACSI - Accra Ghana, he is a Lecturer at the Ecole Supérieure Internationale de Guerre (ESIG) in Yaoundé. Conflict Mediator and International Civil Servant at CERDOTOLA (Intergovernmental Institution for Scientific, Cultural and Diplomatic Cooperation for the Preservation of African Heritage Identities), the graduate from Tilburg is a Scientific Expert for the Caribbean Office of the Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie (AUF), Port-au-Prince, Haiti. He is the author of four major essays and some thirty scientific articles and book chapters.

Copyright WACSI 2021

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be used or reproduced in any manner without written permission of the Institute except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews.

Disclaimer:

WACSI accepts no responsibility for suitability of any materials submitted by the contributors of this publication. WACSI assumes no responsibility or liability for errors or inaccuracies. The author accepts all responsibility for opinions expressed. Use of this research report constitutes acceptance and understanding of these disclaimers.

For more information, write to:

West Africa Civil Society Institute (WACSI)

P.O. Box AT1956 Achimota

Accra, Ghana

Email: info@wacsi.org

Tel: (+233) 303937264

Cite as: Pagnou, S., N. Abanda, M. & Touoyem, P. (2021). The Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon and the imperative of the Cohabitation Pact: Building Peace from the "Great National Dialogue"?. WACSI, Accra Ghana.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	2
INTRODUCTION	3
I. The Great National Dialogue: A Critical Look at the Security Situation in the North-West and South-West Regions of Cameroon	5
A. A republican framework for understanding the crisis in the North-West and South-West regions	5
B. The crisis in the North West and South West regions: dynamics and trajectories of constructing a social problem	6
II. The Great National Dialogue: A Symbolic Space for Resolving the Crisis in the North-West and South-West Regions	8
A. Decentralised public governance: political offer and response to a social demand from the populations of the North-West and South-West?	8
B. Presidential Plan for the Reconstruction and Development of the North-West and South-West Regions	10
III. Conflict Of Interests and Competition Between the Actors: Dialogue and Living Together Versus Partition and Creation of An Ambazonia State	10
A. The "A one and indivisible Cameroon" Benchmark and of Living - Together: Trajectories of a Normative and Cognitive Framework for Public Action	11
B. Secessionist Violence: Between Armed Violence, Symbolic Violence, and Political Demands	12
CONCLUSION	16
BIBLIOGRAPHY	19



Photo by: Stringer/AFP via gettyimages

ABSTRACT

This paper intends to analyse the underpinnings of the Grand National Dialogue as a strategic and operational framework for the construction of a public problem in the crisis between the Cameroonian government and the separatist movements of the North West and South West. The dynamics and related trajectories within the framework of a complex otherness reflect the efforts of the public authorities to domesticate violence and establish the imperative of a "one and indivisible Cameroon" and of living together as structuring frameworks of solutions to crises in the country.

The stake of this Grand National Dialogue also refers to the logic of de-internationalization of the treatment of the crisis; however, this dialogue did not have the desired effect. The denial for a long time focused on the crisis, combined with the problem of underdevelopment accentuated by nepotism, ethnic exclusion, corruption and marginalization, the sequence and consequence of bad governance, has been used by the separatists as a pretext to resort to arms as a means of expressing their 'grievances'.

To achieve this, the separatist movements mobilized symbolic and emotional elements, in particular the decay of basic social structures, the feeling of betrayal, marginalization, domination and above all the minority reflexes. Preventing violent conflict requires that societies be able to address the root and structural causes of conflict including poverty, social inequality, patterns of discrimination and social exclusion.

The Cameroonian government should consider the path of true reconciliation with all Cameroonians, sons and daughters of the North West and South West region. This presupposes and involves a comprehensive and inclusive process, including key instruments such as justice, truth, redress, etc. that allow the transition from a divided past to a common future.

This reconciliation must be sustainable and should help replace "fear" with peaceful coexistence with a view to non-violent social transformation. Hence, the new tasks of thought: to re-weld the broken social bond and restore the lost trust between the stakeholders, the key decision-makers and the actors, the central protagonists as well as all the allies. The main challenge of the dilemma of seeking peace in a fiercely divided society is "how to build and maintain peace".

This reflection brings out useful perspectives for building peace. It answers the following question: what perspectives are useful for building peace in the North West and South West? What are the approaches and practical activities likely to lead to a non-violent social transformation and which have the capacity to make this quest for peace continue? Building peace in the Nord West and South West also requires, beyond traditional state diplomacy, requires a long-term commitment consisting in establishing, between the belligerents, a link that mobilizes, from within, the resources to work for reconciliation and which maximizes contributions from outside. The building of peace relies, so to speak, on the various actors and on activities aimed at achieving and sustaining reconciliation.



Photo from thalesgroup.com

INTRODUCTION

Peace is not a pre-established harmony that is imposed on human societies from the outside. It is eminently social and its structuring in society is realistic. In other words, there is peace only in relation to a socio-political context, and peace within a socio-political community is built around certain balances of power. Realistic peace or social peace is, so to speak, a political construction, the corollary of which is the construction of a democratic state that respects human rights. The hypothesis of realistic peace is therefore that of peace as a cardinal and omnipotent element of social dynamics¹, a framework for socio-political action, a norm of social behaviour, and above all as a model for the production of society around a certain number of issues and power relations in the context of the globalisation of geostrategic and security issues.

Thus, in the theatre of conflict in Cameroon, state power has been overwhelmed and surpassed by the great magnitude of social impulses that reconstruct the balance of authority and command within the state². In its security dimension, the internal and external geopolitics of Cameroon has been dominated for over a decade since the year 2000 by the coalescence of two complex internal security crises. In the Far North region, the jihadist terrorists of Boko Haram are sowing terror and desolation among the population. Since the end of 2016, armed groups have taken advantage of this favourable "window of opportunity" to position their separatist and secessionist demands on the country's national and foreign political agenda thanks to the corporatist demands of teachers and lawyers in the two English-speaking regions of the country, plunging those regions into a situation of instability.

Meanwhile, the country is experiencing the throes of the COVID-19 pandemic. According to statistics published in June 2020, since mid-March 2020, almost 218 people have died, and 8929 people have tested positive³. These security crises with complex stakes, go beyond the simple limits of the Cameroonian national territory⁴. Gérard CHALIAND characterises them as "ritualised wars" and "wars without neighbourhoods", these civil wars "are the most irrational of all wars, so much so that the costs most of the time exceed the very stakes of the conflict"⁵.

Faced with the recurrence of violence and insecurity in the Far North, as well as in the South-West and North-West of the country, and in pursuit of the goal of finding lasting solutions for a return to peace and stability, the Cameroonian government has deployed a series of political, social, and economic measures,⁶ with a strong psychological impact, in order to restore confidence in the perceptions and representations of citizens and republicans. The objective being to reduce to its minimum the psychological impact of terrorism and proto-terrorism, Boko Haram jihadist in the Far North, and secessionist in the North-West and South-West regions⁷.

3 In the north-west where the conflict is raging there are nearly 179 infected cases, with 31 deaths and 518 people tested. In the Southwest, there are nearly 16 deaths and 292 confirmed cases and 715 people tested. See Health Cluster World Health Organization, North-West and South-West, Health Cluster Update, 19 May-03 June 2020 - Bulletin # 06 (June 10, 2020), 11/06/2020, sur <https://reliefweb.int/report/cameroon/cameroon-north-west-and-south-west-health-cluster-update-19-may-03-june-2020-0>

4 G. CHALIAND, Anthologie mondiale de la stratégie : des origines au nucléaire, Robert LAFFONT, 1990, PP. XVIII- XIV.

5 Ibid

6 In these regions, various measures have been taken at the socio-economic level. Inexhaustively, these include: - the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) 2017-2021, and the numerous sectoral projects carried out by the various ministries; - the Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Plan for the North-West and South-West regions created in June 2018 and estimated at 12.7 billion FCFA, which is supposed to address the worsening humanitarian situation (160,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the two regions; In addition, the following actions have been carried out: the effective translation of OHADA texts into English; the creation of a Common Law Section at the National School of Administration and Magistracy to train English-speaking court auditors and registrars; the creation of a Common Law Section at the Supreme Court to hear appeals against decisions of lower courts in common law cases; the creation of a Ministry dedicated to Decentralisation and Local Development. The special recruitment of Bilingual Teachers in Secondary Education; the creation of a National Commission for the Promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism; the halting of the proceedings ordered against certain persons arrested in the context of the crisis in the two regions.

7 Wullson MVOMO ELA, Contribution des Forces de Défense et de Sécurité dans la résolution des crises internes au Cameroun, Honneur et fidélité, December 2019.

1 For a better understanding of the contemporary politics of the peace/democracy and peace/development dialectic in the epistemological renewal of post-bipolar international relations, refer to the inaugural lesson of the expert in international law and international criminal and human rights law, Professor Jean Didier Boukongou for whom the "universal sanctuarisation of peace is denied on a daily basis by the ordinary and routine chaos of conflicts which casts doubt on the capacity of international law to produce a lasting peace dynamic if the dialectical link with development and democracy is not found and maintained permanently" in *De la paix au XXIème siècle*, Yaoundé, UCAC Press, 2007, Page 13.

2 Yves Alexandre CHOUALA, Polis / R.C.S.P. / C.P.S.R. Vol. 8, Special Issue, 2001, P.2.

It is with a view to restoring confidence, peace, and stability that the Grand National Dialogue held in Yaounde from September 30 to October 4, 2019⁸ was convened by the Head of State on September 10, 2019. The aim was to "examine ways and means of responding to the deep aspirations of the people of the North-Western and South-Western regions, but also all the other regions of the country"⁹. Indeed, "the dialogue in question [concerned] mainly the situation in the North-West and South-West regions. This dialogue was built around the following themes: bilingualism, diversity and social cohesion, the education system, the return of refugees and IDPs, the reconstruction and development of regions affected by the conflict, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, decentralisation and local development, the role of the diaspora in the crisis and its participation in the development of the country."¹⁰ In Cameroon, the current theatre of conflict reveals a spiral of political, economic, social and identity-related factors that make it difficult to achieve the climate of peace that has long characterised the country, both in the Far North, but especially in the North-West and South-West. Their inclusion on the national agenda, by the presidential executive institution, is the result of a long-term construction, and because of which the said concerns have attracted the attention of the public authorities at the highest level.



Photo from forbes.com

8 Read Report by the General Rapporteur of the Grand National Dialogue, Yaoundé Conference Center, 4/10/ 2019 <https://nationaldialogue.cm/fr/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2019/10/GDN-Rapport-rapporteur-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral-fr-ok.pdf>

9 Message from the Head of State to the Nation, 10 September 2019.

10 Ibid

This article seeks to analyse the Grand National Dialogue as a framework for constructing social problem. In the sense of complex otherness, the relevant dynamics and trajectories take account of the public authorities' attempts to domesticate violence and thus to identify the categorical imperatives of one and indivisible Cameroon and to live together as structuring mechanisms for resolving the ongoing crises in the country.

The organization of the Grand National Dialogue also demonstrates, through structured political discourse, the rationale of de-internationalisation in coping with the crisis. The process of internationalisation was initiated not only by some international organizations, but also by foreign powers and other actors. While some powers have been or remain favourable to Swiss mediation¹¹ (Canada, Switzerland), others, such as France, Great Britain and the United States, have taken a clear and firm stance towards the Cameroonian authorities on the crisis. This is demonstrated by meetings within the Security Council or meetings in the context of the Arria formula¹² on the crisis in question. These meetings allowed certain powers, such as China and Russia, to reiterate their support for Cameroon through the development of the principle of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. To this effect, the Representative of the Russian Federation, Anatoly Gennadrevitch Bashkin will affirm at the end of his audience with the Cameroonian Foreign Minister, Le Jeune Mbella, the following:

This is demonstrated by meetings within the Security Council or meetings in the context of the Arria formula on the crisis in question. These meetings allowed certain powers, such as China and Russia, to reiterate their support for Cameroon through the development of the principle of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. The Representative of the Russian Federation, Anatoly Gennadrevitch Bashkin to this effect stated at the end of his meeting with Le Jeune Mbella, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cameroon, that,

*"We are opposed to a humanitarian intervention and once again our position is that the Cameroonian President, the government and the people can solve the problem themselves without international intervention"*¹³.

11 The Swiss mediation proposed by the Swiss government has so far been approved by the separatist movements as a neutral intermediary in the management of the crisis. The Swiss mediators are working to prepare the separatists for the techniques of negotiation and the drafting of grievances. The Cameroonian authorities did not support this mediation, which once again avoided a form of containment and internationalisation of the reconciliation process. Also, the deep rapprochement of the Swiss and the secrecy surrounding these negotiations led to its depreciation by the public authorities. Read: Le conflit anglophone au Cameroun Un dialogue sans partenaires, Cynthia Petrigh IFRI, October 2019, P.28.

12 RFI, Crise au Cameroun anglophone : le point à l'ONU sur les dernières avancées, 13/12/2019 on <http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20191213-crise-cameroun-anglophone-onu-fait-le-point-dernieres-avancees>

13 Africa. Le360, Cameroon. Crise-Anglophone, la Russie prône la non-ingérence, 20/03/2020 <https://afrique.le360.ma/autres-pays/politique/2020/03/06/29714-cameroun-crise-anglophone-la-russie-prone-la-non-ingence-29714>

These battles around internationalisation and competition around the mediation of the Anglophone crisis were likely to reduce the scope of public action to resolve the crisis. Managing this internal crisis within the country, indeed appeared to be a priority for the Government to reaffirm its leadership in the area of qualification. Contrary to what separatist expected, the government's discourse, with republican referents, echoed wide. The Grand National Dialogue was a hermeneutic to be addressed in this discourse, however it was more specifically to consider the North-West and South-West security situation (I). In so doing, it took account of the divergent dynamics and interests between the actors (II) and efforts to find global solutions to the current crisis (III).

I - THE GREAT NATIONAL DIALOGUE: A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE NORTH-WEST AND SOUTH-WEST REGIONS OF CAMEROON

The specific trajectory of the crisis in the North-West and South-West regions reflects the dynamics of its construction as a social problem (B). Within the Cameroonian public space, one will notice a mobilisation-competition involving both public authorities and other social actors. And their multifaceted interpretations will help to make the Grand National Dialogue a context for understanding the crisis in the North-West and South-West (A).

A. A Republican Framework for Understanding the Crisis in the North-West and South-West Regions

A widespread mobilisation of the various social actors was observed from the beginning of the return to crisis in the North-West and South-West regions. Public authorities, civil society, political parties, diplomatic representations present in Cameroon, Cameroonians from all walks of life have taken up the issue, rightly or wrongly labelling the causes of such a violent upsurge in this southern part of the country. Some presented the crisis as an attempted insurrection against the central government in Yaoundé from the North-West and South-West regions. Others were quick to raise the hypothesis that the crisis is an "English-speaking issue" coming from the hegemonic agreements that led to Cameroon reuniting in 1961. This labelling of the situation, which is still valid, is likely to call into question the deep peaceful social ties that have hitherto existed between Cameroonians.

Indeed, the shift in the agenda from the corporatist demands of English-speaking teachers and lawyers to secessionist tendencies, with the attendant violence and political demands linked to federalism, has enabled the crisis to move on to a new stage, both in its characterisation and in the representations and perceptions it has engendered. The political¹⁴, economic¹⁵, social¹⁶, identity¹⁷, security and humanitarian¹⁸ referents were thus widely mobilised to

¹⁴ Political demands have mainly focused on secession and federalism.

¹⁵ We are referring here to the geopolitics of natural resources in the North-West and South-West regions.

¹⁶ The blockade and the dead cities imposed by the separatist armed groups affect the daily life of the populations, their freedom of movement, and reduce their access to certain basic services such as basic health care, water and access to regular markets for food.

¹⁷ Cameroon News, National Unity in Cameroon: the tribal curse, 22/05/2020 on <https://actu.cameroon.com/2020/05/22/unite-nationale-au-cameroon-la-malediction-tribale/> consulted on 15/06/2020 at 6pm

¹⁸ The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there have been nearly 3,000 deaths since the beginning of the crisis, plus 1.5 million displaced persons, including more than 50,000 refugees who have fled to neighbouring regions of Nigeria, notably Cross River State and Benue State, UNHCR West and Central Africa, January 2020, <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/unhcr-west-and-central-africa-update-january2020> consulted on 15 June 2020 at 6pm.



Photo from studyabroad.sit.edu

address the situation. Thus making it part of the long-lasting revenge of history¹⁹. Indeed, the resurgence of the past is increasingly taking place in today's societies. Just as political and strategic use can be made of history, there is the imperative need to summon the legacy of the past to better avoid certain historical analogies which can sometimes be used as mobilising slogans for political purposes.

Some observers see in the emergence of this crisis, geostrategic and geopolitical motives articulated around the exploitation of natural resources present in English-speaking regions and the destabilization of Cameroon; a pivotal state in Central Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. This places it at the centre of all attention. This interpretation reveals a strategic and private war which exposes the war promoters, their modes of action and whose violence would constitute one of the surest means of appropriating the natural resources contained in the subsoil of the North-West and South-West regions. Indeed, according to Philippe le Billon, access to income from natural resources makes it possible to buy arms and finance the rebellions. The rebels or separatist movements could also benefit from external financial support by signing future exploitation agreements between transnational companies and/or the rebels, around its resources (Booty future). Here, the intervention of a neighbouring state in an internal conflict can most often be explained by the fact of wanting to give its support to the rebel movements, with a view to seeing the government in power being overthrown.

Faced with these different interpretations of the current situation in the North-West and South-West regions, the Grand National Dialogue (GND) appeared to be a real forum for understanding the crisis. Beyond the refusal of some separatist leaders like Ebenezer Akwanga, Cho Ayaba, Samuel Ikome Sako, Mark Bareta, the participants present at the GND, constituting several members of the Cameroonian government, ex-combatants, religious leaders, traditional chiefs, representatives of political parties, and some actors of the international community, met at the Yaoundé Conference Centre in the political capital of Cameroon in order to discuss and take a common look at the root causes of the crisis, especially the reasons that led some Cameroonians taking up arms, and above all, to find a favourable outcome to this situation with a view to a return to peace and stability in the South-West and North-West regions – the main reason for this dialogue. This mobilisation-competition of social actors made it possible to account for the dynamics and trajectories of publicising the English-speaking issues.

B. The Crisis in the North West and South West Regions: Dynamics and Trajectories of Constructing a Social Problem

The crisis in the English-speaking regions of the country, as well as its management, appears to be long term²⁰. In fact, for the historian Fernand Braudel, "history is not only a narrative, even of great events, it is an explanation"²¹. In this respect, the civic space, produced in the Cameroonian situation by a double process of liberalisation of speech and the media²² initiated in the early 1990s, becomes a framework for objectifying public action to resolve the crisis. Also, the security situation in the North-West and South-West will be put on the agenda, understood as "all the problems that are dealt with in any form whatsoever by the public authorities and therefore likely to be the subject of one or more decisions".²³

In the Cameroonian context, the process of selecting issues and the way in which some of them may or may not attract public attention – "a scarce resource, the allocation of which depends on competition within a system of public arenas"²⁴ – proves to be relevant. If at the end of 2016, when the protests were launched in the North-West and South-West regions, the Government took a series of measures²⁵ to resolve the crisis, the convening of the Grand National Dialogue by the Head of State makes sense in that it underpins a process of specific publicising and setting of an agenda. Understanding the dynamics of collective mobilisation, media coverage and politicisation allows us to grasp the sometimes subterranean logics that have framed its agenda setting through the GND.

20 Fernand Braudel, Comment on récrit l'histoire. Les usages du temps dans les Écrits sur l'histoire de Fernand Braudel, Revue d'Histoire du XIX^e siècle, P. 57-81, <https://journals.openedition.org/rh19/419 consulté le 15/06/2020 at 6pm>

21 Fernand Braudel, Les ambitions de l'histoire, Éditions de Fallois/Livre de poche, 1997, p.37. The edition brings together the lectures of the years 1941-1944 and texts already collected in Écrits sur l'histoire, 1969.

22 ABE C., « Espace public et recompositions de la pratique politique au Cameroun », Polis/R.C.S.P. /C.P.S.R.Vol. 13, Numéros 1 - 2, 2006, p. 42-43.

23 Garraud P., 1990, « Politiques nationales : l'élaboration de l'agenda », L'Année sociologique, p. 27.

24 Hilgartner S. et Bosk C., 1988, « The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public Arena Mode I », American Journal of Sociology, vol. 94, n° 1, p.55

25 Several sectoral measures have been adopted by the Government to respond to demands seen as corporatist from the outset: the creation of English-speaking sections in some higher institution of education; the creation of new establishments and departments in the State Universities; the special recruitment for scientific subjects of 1000 young bilingual teachers; the redeployment of teachers from the two education sub-systems according to their language skills; and the creation, on 23 January 2017, of a National Commission for the Promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism; on 20 June 2018, an Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Plan of 12 billion FCFA for the victims of this crisis was launched by the government; well before the creation, on 30 November 2018, of a National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (CNDDR) of ex-combatants from Boko Haram and armed rebel groups. The release of 298 detainees in December 2018. A five-fold increase in the decentralisation budget for 2019. From an operational point of view, a fifth Joint Military Region (RMIA5) was created on 21 February 2018 by the Cameroonian Head of State, by splitting up the former 2nd Joint Military Region (RMIA 2) which initially covered the Littoral, West and NO-SW regions. With Bamenda as its command post and covering the West and North-West, the RMIA5 coordinates its actions with the RMIA2 dedicated to the South-West regions.

19 Burno Tertrais, La revanche de l'histoire, Odile Jacobs, 2017, P.144.



Photo from: Simbanemattick via [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

From a constructivist perspective, the dynamics of the North-West and South-West crisis in the Cameroonian public space says a lot about the perceptions and induced representations of this situation, thereby reinforcing the idea that no problem is intrinsically public because of its specific properties. Most of the problems are the subject of an important work of labelling carried out by collective actors or moral entrepreneurs²⁶, as part of a social and political process. The situation in the North-West and South-West regions, in the first instance, takes on a corporatist dimension to address certain shortcomings observed in the judicial and education sectors. Next, there is a progressive armed and violent protest, against a backdrop of separatist and secessionist tendencies. The violent and worrying nature of the situation on the ground and the socio-economic impact of the crisis have led to the deployment of the country's defensive and security measures to restore order, ensure the security of property and people, and above all to thwart the initiatives of separatist groups.

The complexity of the situation, accentuated by the "fear" aroused by the separatist fighters, the repeated and repetitive attacks against the population, the defence and security forces and the relative effectiveness of the actions carried out so far, made it possible to bring the crisis out of the banal order, that is to say, "what is expected, because it repeats itself without surprise, in everyday deeds and gestures". However, the convening of the GND has basically helped to deconstruct the dominant discourse of the situation as the affair of Cameroonians only in the North-West and South-West regions. The social and economic impact, which was reflected in the slowdown of economic activities, the paralysis of some administrations, the flow

of IDPs, especially towards the neighbouring West and Coastal regions, the displacement of some Cameroonians to neighbouring Nigeria, associated with the dynamics of mobilization, mediation, and politicization in particular, have contributed to its effective agenda. According to Kingdon, the setting of an agenda is a combination of three streams. Firstly, the "problem stream" or the emergence of a problem that attracts the attention of public authorities through indicators (statistics)²⁷ pushing for an active engagement of national public opinion, precisely the political parties involved. Secondly, the "political stream" having led to the establishment of a set of available, adoptable and adaptable public policy solutions, according to "their technical feasibility, their compatibility with dominant values and their capacity to anticipate future constraints" and lastly, the "policy stream". For Kingdon, these streams are applicable when "a problem is recognised, [to which] a solution is developed and available within the public policy community, [to which] a political change makes it the right time for a policy change and the potential constraints are not too strong"²⁸. However, it should be remembered that no single model can describe all the factors that set the agenda or the whole process²⁹ of the situation in Cameroon.


27 This includes data on the infrastructure destroyed, the number of deaths, both among the population and the defence and security forces, the economic losses, the impact on other regions of the country, on the national economy, and on the normal functioning of institutions in both regions.

28 Kingdon J., 1984, *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*, Boston, Little Brown and Company, p. 174.

29 Knoepfel P, Larue C., and F. Varone (2001). *Mise à l'agenda politique. Analyse et pilotage des politiques publiques*. Geneva: Helbing & Lichtenhahn.

26 The expression is borrowed from Becker H. (ed.), 1966, *Social Problems: A Modern Approach*, New York, John Wiley, p. 11

Plan 1: Setting the agenda for the Anglophone problem according to the Kingdon model



II - THE GREAT NATIONAL DIALOGUE: A SYMBOLIC SPACE FOR RESOLVING THE CRISIS IN THE NORTH-WEST AND SOUTH-WEST REGIONS

Several measures³⁰ have been taken in the context of the GND. Among these, decentralised public governance (A) has emerged as a relevant political offer in that it responds to certain aspirations of the populations of the North-West AND South-West regions. The same is true of the Presidential Reconstruction Plan (B) for the regions in question, set up to ensure their rapid reconstruction and recovery.

A. Decentralised Public Governance: Political Offer and Response to a Social Demand from the Populations of the North-West and South-West?

Decentralised public governance as a means of managing the city, with the indirect or direct participation of the population in their affairs, is strongly rooted in the country's historical trajectory well before its independence. Thus, under French or English administration, within the framework of authority or trusteeship, the country has experimented with local models of administering the affairs of the tutelary city.

It seems relevant not to underestimate the influence of Indirect Rule on the social representations and perceptions of the populations living in these regions. As

a matter of fact, the British administration, consciously or unconsciously, is a significant legacy in all aspects of life. The nostalgic dimension of indirect administration, structured around Nigerian federalism, which is a vector of a certain type of autonomy has gradually been instituted as real social capital³¹ through its specificity in the relationships between citizens and administration, transmitted and passed down through generations. The British and French administrations actually organised all the aspects (economic, political, cultural, educational, etc.) of the social life of the populations of West and East Cameroon, in such a way as to leave a lasting mark on the "collective representation". Capitalism, "the glue that binds communities, organisations, businesses and different social and ethical groups", is expressed here through this legacy of social structures inherited from British indirect rule.

Included on the agenda of the Great National Dialogue in the framework of Commission n° 8 dedicated to decentralisation and local development, decentralised public governance was put forward as a political offer aimed at considering the deep aspirations of the North-West and South-West population, as well as the

³⁰ Among other things, the release of nearly 333 prisoners incarcerated in connection with the electoral crisis and the opponent Maurice Kamto of the Movement for the Revival of Cameroon.

³¹ For Bourdieu, it is a question of "all the actual and potential resources linked to the possession of a lasting network of more or less institutionalised relations of mutual knowledge and recognition", Bourdieu P., Le capital social. In: Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales. Vol. 31, January 1980. Le capital social. pp. 2-3

specificities of the said regions. Hence, annihilates the secessionist tendencies resulting from the corporatist demands that have taken place. Granting special status to the North-West and South-West Regions constitutes in this respect a real public policy and, as a response to the demand from the populations in the said regions, a major element of the Great National Dialogue. This political framework is based on the revised Act 96/06 of January 18, 1996 of the June 2, 1972 Constitution, amended and supplemented by Act 2008/001 of April 14, 2008, which sets the General Framework for Decentralisation³² in Cameroon. By reaffirming the Republic of Cameroon to be a "decentralized unitary State,"³³ the said law enshrines the regions and districts as decentralized territorial authorities³⁴. About the special character attributed to some regions, it is captured in Article 62(1). In fact, according to the said article, "The above general regime shall apply to all regions. (2) Without prejudice to the provisions of this Title, the law may take into account the specific features of certain regions in their organisation and operation".

The Content of the Special Statute

The law creating a special status³⁵ for the North-West and South-West regions, sent to parliament on December 13, 2019 by the Cameroonian Government, offers a legal specificity to these two regions and therefore the possibility of participating in the development of national public policies relating to the administration of justice in accordance with the Common Law sub-system, the English-speaking education sub-system and the creation of regional missions of traditional chieftaincy. Specificity should be given to the Regional Assembly and the Regional Executive Council in both regions. The Regional Assembly is composed of 90 members as in all regions and consists of two chambers the "House of Divisional Representatives" and the "House of Chiefs". The aim is to bring the two chambers together and allow their members to discuss together or separately on the issues submitted to them. The Law also provides for the appointment of an independent mediator under the title "Public Independent Conciliator" appointed by presidential decree on the joint proposal of the Regional Assembly and the State representative of the region concerned. The latter will act

as a channel of communication between the populations of the North-West and South-West regions and the administrative authorities³⁶. The Public Independent Conciliator in the independent exercise of his functions will have to fulfil his responsibilities, particularly those of submitting to the competent administrative authorities, the grievances of the populations and ensuring the measures taken during the Great National Dialogue regarding the use of the English language, the implementation of the English-speaking education sub-system and the practice and respect of Common Law.

Cameroon is a ward of international institutions (League of Nations (LON): 1919-1945; United Nations (UN): 1945-1960). This historical heritage has strongly marked the social structures, mentality, representations and perceptions of the population in general, which were then marked by both direct French administration and indirect rule of British inspiration. This second modality of administration was particularly implemented in the North-West and South-West regions of Cameroon.

While ensuring respect for the cultural specificities of these regions, the objective of this status is to rationalise the principle of inter-communal cooperation and strengthen local democracy, while adapting the territorial organisation to the challenges and constraints of the globalisation-mundialisation of cities and the multiple social transformations. The relationship between decentralised authorities and administrative authorities needs to be clarified. By putting people back at the core of local democracy, their role in managing the resources of the regions or municipalities would help to revitalise local governance. This would first require a real professionalisation of the staff working within decentralised local authorities. The creation of the National School of Local Administration on March 2, 2020 in Buea, dedicated to the training of staff of decentralised local authorities or to the strengthening of their capacities, is part of this effort for responsible public governance, backed up by the requirements of performance and results-based management to better address the needs of the populations at the municipal and regional level.

In this regard, putting national interests in line with regional and municipal needs would be necessary. The bodies of the decentralised local authorities should reflect the sociological components and anthropological

32 The legal framework of decentralisation in Cameroon is made up of the following texts: Law n°2004/017 of July 22, 2004 on the orientation of decentralization; Law n°2004/018 of July 22, 2004 fixing the rules applicable to communes; Law n°2004/019 of July 22, 2004 fixing the rules applicable to regions; Law n°2006/005 of July 14, 2006 fixing the conditions for the election of senators; Law n°2006/004 of July 14, 2006 fixing the mode of election of regional councillors; Law n°2009/11 of July 10, 2009 on the financial regime of decentralised authorities; Law n°2009/019 of December 15, 2009 on local taxation; Decree n°2010/1735/PM of June 1, 2010 fixing the budgetary nomenclature of decentralised territorial authorities.

33 Article 1 of Law n°96/06 of January 18, 1996 revising the Constitution of June 02, 1972, amended and supplemented by Law n°2008/001 of April 14, 2008.

34 Article 55(1) of the Law No. 96/06 of January 18, 1996.

35 This project abolishes, where appropriate, the position of government delegate to urban communities.

36 Investing in Cameroon; The content of the special status granted to the English-speaking regions of Cameroon subject to the validation of the Parliament 13/12/2019 consulted 27/05/2020 on <https://www.investiraucameroun.com/gestion-publique/1312-13756-le-contenu-du-statut-special-accorde-aux-regions-anglophones-du-cameroun-soumis-a-la-validation-du-parlement>



Photo by Jean Pierre Kepseu/Xinhua

realities of the region and the municipality. In the sense of the British indirect administration, a greater role for the Native Authorities in regional and local bodies, with direct consultation missions similar to their role in the past, will make it possible to identify them as true defenders of the people and transmit their desires from the grassroots to the region.

B. Presidential Plan for the Reconstruction and Development of the North-West and South-West Regions

Beyond the special status, the Head of State has launched a reconstruction plan with a budget of 8.9 billion CFAF, with a view to pursuing the implementation of key recommendations of the Grand National Dialogue. This Presidential Plan for Reconstruction piloted by the Minister of Economy, Planning and Land Management (MINEPAT), Alamine Ousmane Mey with the technical support of the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Cameroon, Jean Luc Stalon,³⁷ whose budget represents 10% of overall expenditure, will be used to restore social cohesion, rebuild, and rehabilitate basic infrastructure and rejuvenate the local economy.

According to the National Coordinator of the said Plan, Paul Tasong,³⁸ the first axes of the Plan concern, *“the intense sensitization of the beneficiaries of the plan, the rehabilitation of schools, health centres, roads, the reconstruction of bridges, the rehabilitation of water points and the re-establishment of electricity lines that have been destroyed. This plan also envisages the promotion of intensive agriculture through the distribution of agricultural inputs as well as the reconstruction of certain markets”*.³⁹ The financial cap for this first axis is set at 36 billion CFA francs.

37 On May 5, 2020, the Minister of Economy, Planning and Land Management (Minepat), and the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme, signed a partnership agreement which set the course for the activities of this reconstruction plan and the adequate financing estimated at CFAF 8.9 billion. Read Minepat, Reconstruction of the NORTHWEST AND SOUTHWEST: the government is mobilising 8.9 billion for the launch of the Presidential Plan: The State is mobilising 8.9 billion CFA Francs for the reconstruction of English-speaking areas; 6/05/2020 https://www.minepat.gov.cm/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=584:reconstruction-du-Nord-Ouest-et-du-Sud-Ouest-le-gouvernement-mobilise-8-9-milliards-pour-le-lancement-du-planpresidentiel&catid=24&lang=fr&Itemid=144 consulté le 27/05/2020 à 10h.

38 Deputy Minister of Economy, Planning and Regional Development (Minepat) since March 2, 2018, aged 57. Born in M'kombe in the department of Lébialem, in South West Cameroon. He had previously held the posts of Commissioner in charge of the department of economic, monetary and financial policies at the ECCAS Commission (2012-2017); Secretary General of Minepat (2010-2012) and Director of Public Investment Programming at the Ministry of Economy and Finance (2004-2010).

39 Interview with the Coordinator on May 15, 2020..

Several actors acknowledge that these responses would not be adequate to meet the demands of the English-speaking part, be it the reconstruction plan or the special status given to the North-West and South-West regions, as some issues, such as those of federalism, were ignored from the outset⁴⁰. The dynamics of the crisis in the North-West and South-West regions as a public problem reflect the order of discourse and the modalities of action of the various public actors and armed separatist groups to promote their respective visions of Cameroon, whose conflicting interests remain real catalysts for the recurrence of the crisis and thus armed violence.

III - CONFLICT OF INTERESTS AND COMPETITION BETWEEN THE ACTORS: DIALOGUE AND LIVING TOGETHER VERSUS PARTITION AND CREATION OF AN AMBAZONIA STATE

Emerging from a crisis is a particularly laborious task. While it is easier to see violence or a crisis erupt, it remains difficult to stop the escalation of violence or even find a lasting consensus between the conflicting parties. For Philippe Braud, crises arise from the *“dilution or disappearance of moral or legal points of reference, legal procedures that used to regulate exchanges in detail, in order to better enshrine their stability, are no longer observed; everyone is unaware of the distribution of competences between the various institutions. Today we no longer respect what we used to revere, iconoclasm attacks what was considered sacred until now”*⁴¹.

Identity crisis, a legitimacy crisis, a participation crisis, a distribution crisis and a penetration crisis. These crises can be seen from the perspectives of the compatibility or conflict of interests, which can take the form of an identity crisis,⁴² a legitimacy crisis⁴³, a participation crisis⁴⁴, a distribution crisis⁴⁵ and a penetration crisis⁴⁶. The incompatibility of interests can be due to human nature,

40 Les Yeux du Monde: Crisis in English-speaking Cameroon: the failure of the Great National Dialogue, 9/11/2019, <https://les-yeux-du-monde.fr/actualite/actualite-analyse/41928-crise-cameroun-anglophone-echec-grand-dialogue-national> consulted on 27/05/2020 at 10am

41 Braud, Philippe, Sociologie politique, 11th Edition, Paris, LGDJ, 2014, p. 18

42 Disagreement between elites and counter-elites on the establishment of a common system of values and symbols, and conflicts around schooling institutions (religions, school, media, etc.).

43 Disagreements between elites and counter-elites about the founding principles of the political system that could mobilise a common allegiance to the political system or the state.

44 Conflict over the extent to which the state apparatus can impose the equalisation of socio-economic conditions between segments of the population and/or regional or local entities.

45 Disagreement between elites and counter-elites over the granting of political and social rights to the entire population (including the right to vote).

46 Conflict over the extent to which the state apparatus can set up an administrative mesh of territory whose agents only obey centrally



Photo from, wingsradio.org

which imposes itself on us as a need that, according to Galtung, "is not chosen, but imposed on us"⁴⁷. This issue of compatibility or incompatibility conditions the possibility or impossibility of the dialogue. The quality of a dialogue lies in the willingness of the parties concerned to come together within a framework to understand the needs and expectations of all and to develop new solutions that help to satisfy them. This is what Juanita Brown describes as "conversations that matter"⁴⁸. Thus, the government would set the universal standard of a "one and indivisible Cameroon"⁴⁹ and of living together, as a coordinated system of action (A) in the face of secessionist tendencies (B).

A. The "A one and indivisible Cameroon" Benchmark and of Living - Together: Trajectories of a Normative and Cognitive Framework for Public Action

"The future of our compatriots in the North-West and South-West lies within our Republic".⁵⁰ Evidently, the structuring model of a one and indivisible Cameroon, for the Head of State, Paul Biya, and his Government, is at the centre of public action both in its representation of the situation and in the solutions mapped up. In fact, any process of developing public policy requires the construction of a representation, an image of the reality on which one wants to intervene. It is with reference to this cognitive image that the actors organise their perception of the problem, confront their solutions and

define their proposals for action: this vision of the world is the standard for a policy⁵¹. This global framework has structured all the actions carried out by the State since the crisis in the North-West and South-West regions, as well as the dynamics inherent in the Great National Dialogue, the main catalyst for State action in this context.

The proclamation of the "Ambazonia State"⁵² on October 1, 2017, engaged the Government in a kind of symbolic competition to "survive" in the public space and convince some irredentists to the vision of "a one and indivisible" Cameroon. It is driven by an "advocacy coalition", i.e. a set of actors of a public policy as they share a certain number of beliefs constituting a vision of the world organised at three levels: a central core or "deep core" made up of general beliefs not linked to a specific policy (the virtues of Unity, of Peace), beliefs linked to a specific policy "policy core" and secondary aspects corresponding to more technical issues⁵³ such as the acceleration of the decentralisation process and local development, taking into account the socio-cultural and linguistic specificities of regions in crisis. This "advocacy coalition" could be assimilated to the "hegemonic bloc", as conceptualised by Gramsci and taken up by Jean François Bayart, structured around the constraints inherent to political continuity, the preservation of territorial integrity and the guarantee of security for each and everyone.

Having the GND at the highest level and its inclusion in the national political agenda, thereby reflecting presidential pre-eminence, made it possible to recognize that the situation now calls for a public, republican debate. Efforts to involve ALL Cameroonians, through consultations prior to the major dialogue of actors from different political parties, lawyers, teachers, civil society actors, religious authorities, trade union leaders and students, Cameroonians, diplomatic representations in Cameroon, did not elicit the support of the main figures of the armed protest. The situation, despite the problematisation of the main demands within the framework of this great republican dialogue, allows two main tendencies to be identified.

On the one hand, there is a real difficulty in convincing the leaders of the separatist groups on the table of an inclusive dialogue wanted by all. This reflects the inoperative nature

47 Galtung, Transcendence and Conflict Transformation, Op.cit. P.15.

48 Reflections on The World Café, Shaping Our Futures Through Conversations That Matter, Juanita Brown The World Café Community, inBerrett-Koehler, SanFrancisco, <http://www.theworldcafe.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/sofdownload1.pdf>.

49 This republican posture is also supported by the Cameroonian parliamentary institution known for its notorious silence "authoritarian routines" on all issues that would tend to challenge the monopoly of the government. On October 1, 2016, a parliamentary meeting was organized in support of peace and indivisibility in Cameroon. The objective, to strengthen offensive regional nationalism against the voiceless state read ; Yvan ISSEKIN, Localiser le refus de la sécession à Yaoundé : jeux et enjeux du meeting parlementaire de soutien pour la paix et l'indivisibilité du Cameroun du 1er octobre 2017, L'Espace politique, Numéro 35, 2017, <https://journals.openedition.org/espacepolitique/5275#authors>

50 Message from the Head of State to the Nation - 10 Sept 2019 <https://www.prc.cm/fr/actualites/discours/3776-message-du-chef-de-l-etat-a-la-nation-10-sept-2019>, consulté le 22/05/2020

51 Muller P., Les politiques publiques, Que Sais-je, Second Edition, PUF, 18/04/2018.

52 Cameroonweb: Independence of Ambazonie: Ayuk Tabe's full speech in 2017, September 30, 2018, on <https://www.cameroonweb.com/CameroonHomePage/NewsArchive/Ind-pendance-de-l-Ambazonie-l-int-gral-discours-de-Ayuk-Tabé-en-2017-Retro-447682>, consulté le 26/01/2018 à 8h.

53 Cf. P. A. Sabatier, E. Schlager, "Les approches cognitives des politiques publiques: perspectives américaines", Revue française de science politique, April 2000, vol. 50, no. 22.

of the confidence-building measures implemented to date, which do not seem to be gaining any real traction. Confidence is a "firm belief in the competence of an entity to act reliably within a specific context".⁵⁴ It meets the conditions of sincerity of actions taken and the dissemination of relevant information⁵⁵.

On the other hand, the situation reflects the complexity of the security environment in a war against an enemy from the inside, which would be further complicated by knowledge about the "enemy" inside, in the heuristic understanding of the dynamics that structure their real motivations, their organisational structure of power and power relations both within and outside these groups.

In this context of "re-problematisation" in which the exercise of public power is put to the test of inclusive dialogue, the construction of confidence-building measures towards separatist groups, but above all of appeasement and security in crisis regions with a view to a lasting return to peace, an indispensable condition for the recovery of these regions. This situation also provides a framework for analysing the balance of power⁵⁶ which would reflect the political, security and social complexity of the local area, through a general imbalance of the territory;⁵⁷ this peripheral analysis would tend to play down the power of the Leading Office in Yaoundé⁵⁸.



Photo by: Stringer/AFP via gettyimages

54 T. Grandisson, M. Sloman, "A survey of trust in internet applications. Communications Surveys & Tutorials", IEEE, vol. 3, no 4, 2000, PP. 2-16.

55 E.Lorini, R.Demolombe, "From binary trust to graded trust in information sources: A logical perspective", LNAI 5396, 2008, pp.205-225.

56 Foucault Michel, 2013, La société punitive : cours au Collège de France, 1972-1973, Paris, France, EHESS/Gallimard/Seuil

57 Fred Eboko and Patrick Awondo, L'État stationnaire, entre chaos et renaissance, Politique africaine 2018/2 (n° 150), pages 5 to 27 consulted on 28/05/2020 at 12am, on <https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2018-2-page-5.htm>

58 Sindjoun Luc, L'État ailleurs. Entre noyau dur et case vide, Paris, Economica, 2002.

The Dialogue, against the backdrop of internal crises, also revolves around the technologies of local government through fear and "anxiety", which have taken into account the aspirations of the populations in the North-West and South-West regions. The implementation of a special status in these two regions, which will have to consider the cultural and linguistic specificities inherited from the context of international trusteeship and particularly, from the British administration of these two regions.

B. Secessionist Violence: Between Armed Violence, Symbolic Violence, and Political Demands

Separatist movements (Red Dragons, Tigers and Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF) and militias, self-defence groups) have, since the recurrence of the crisis, not stopped claiming the "partition", "secession" of Cameroon and therefore the "creation of the Ambazonia State". This paradigm has structured their main demands which have been translated on the ground by armed violence. This process of ideological construction can be defined as a collectively shared set of images, ideals, and aspirations. It provides members with a coherent orientation and gives them an image of themselves as a group in which they recognise themselves, hence reinforcing the identity of the community. To the discourse of secession supported by the armed groups, the State has opposed the notion of "one and indivisible Cameroon", framed by the supreme legal norm; the Constitution which, in its article 1 paragraph 2 stipulates that "the Republic of Cameroon shall be a (...) unitary State. It shall be one and indivisible". Article 64 of the same law prohibits any constitutional revision procedure that would undermine the unity and territorial integrity of the country⁵⁹.

59 Such a constitutional text has also found a favourable echo in the weaving of bonds of living together socially between Cameroonians of the Anglophone and Francophone parts united by social ties (marriages, cultural and religious encounters) which have consolidated the ideology of a united nation beyond the unequal sharing that took place during the 1961 plebiscites.

Table 1: Different political and armed groups involved in the situation in the North-West and South-West

Major factions	Acronym	Meaning	Leaders	Political Affiliation	Main Objective
Ambazonia	ADSC	Anglophone Self-Defence Council, the Red Dragons	Siseku Juluis Ayuk Tabe (In prison) Samuel Sako	Interim Gorvenment (IG) most strategic brand	Immediate independence of Southern and Northern Cameroon;
	ADF	Ambazonia self-defence force	Ayoba Cho (Norway)	A m b a z o n i a Gorvening council (AGC) Ex IG	Avenge Anglophone indiscriminate violence;
	SOCADEF	Southern Cameroon defense forces	E b e n e z e r Akwango	African people liberation Movement APLM Ex IG	Ensure a dominating role in the political and economic future;
	SCLC	Anglophone Self-Defence Council and others groups	Fontem Neba (Washington)	Southern Cameroon liberation council	Secure lasting political and economic arrangement
Non armed Groups	MORIS	Movement for the restauration of independent south	Bo Hebert	MORIS	Create insecurity and instability in specific areas to ensure access to economic Resources
	SCNC	Southern Cameroon National Council	Nfor Ngala Nfor (in prison)/ Elvis Komenta	SNC	
O t h e r s independetists (Corporatists)	CACSC	C a m e r o o n Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC, known as "the Consortium").	Agbo Balla, S e s s e m e , Wilfred Tassanf...	CACSC	Federalism

Faced with this governmental posture, the separatist groups adopted a radical stance and deployed a series of actions aimed at convincing the populations of the North-West and South-West to adhere to their idea of a partitioning the North-West and the South-West regions⁶⁰ from the united Cameroon. The propensity to radicalism, Veldhuis and Staun⁶¹ point out, is rooted in the denial of fundamental rights and freedoms or political oppression. This denial of rights and freedoms is a catalyst for political radicalisation which can take the form of terrorist activities. This denial, combined with the problem of underdevelopment accentuated by nepotism, ethnic exclusion, corruption, and marginalisation, are recurrent in the Cameroonian socio-political domain⁶². The economic, political, and social marginalisation resulting from poor governance has been used by separatists as justification for using arms as a means of expressing their 'grievances'. In order to accomplish this, the separatist movements have mobilised and presented to the populations of the North-West and South-West, symbolic elements, social structures,

common interests, constructed and nurtured by a triple feeling of betrayal, marginalisation and domination; the basis of which is the myth of the minority⁶³.

The argument of the marginalised minority had already been expressed in the past in the 1990 Buea Declaration as follows:

"Our problem... is that Francophone leaders have betrayed our trust and there is no transparency in public affairs. Our Union Agreement During these thirty-two years has been breached. We have been deprived of electoral rights, marginalized, treated with suspicion; our interests have been disregarded; our participation in the life of the nation has been confined to non-essential functions...we have gone from being equal partners to being a people under yoke".⁶⁴

This triptych of a marginalised, betrayed and dominated minority realised around symbolic mobilisations,⁶⁵ speeches, propagandas, through effective mediatisation (the presence of the media: radio, television, playstore-

⁶⁰ [Today in Ambazonia](#) we celebrated our national Independence Day. 1st of October 1961. God. A video circulating on social networks shows the participation of young people from the North-West and South-West and some traditional authorities taking part in the parade organised by the separatist movements on October 1, 2019, we can see a real motivation of these populations ns to the initiative.

⁶¹ Veldhuis, T. & Staun, J. , Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model, The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. 2004.

⁶² Jean-François Bayart: L'Etat au Cameroun Paris, Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences Politiques, 1979.

⁶³ Ibid

⁶⁴ Statement by the English-speaking Congress at its meeting 1 Buea, 2nd – 3rd April 1993 <http://www.politiqueaine.com/numes/pdf/051139.pdf>

⁶⁵ Ibid



AmbaRadio, platform for dissemination of the state's ideology



Ambacoin, Ambazonia State Currency




Flag of Ambazonia Symbol of ancient Cameroon




Notional State Declaration of Independence Plateau



Southern Cameroon broadcasting cooperation TV(SCBC)



Ambacoin Crowsales Community /Project Finance Bank of the fictitious state of Ambazonia




mobile application), publicity, even internationalisation (hosting of the All Ambazonia Conference in Washington) and a politicisation. The desire to create an Ambazonian entity with state referents has also resulted in the implementation of important symbols (flag, "defence funding statehood, diplomacy" emblem, the "proclamation of the State of Ambazonia"⁶⁶ and appeals for funding and schemes (by way of the Ambacoin crow sales community), with a view to organising actions deemed "just" and "liberating" . In addition, lobbying activities have been carried out by emblematic actors of the diaspora.

These symbolic mobilisations have encouraged the conscious or unconscious support of a large section of the population. The armed groups, following the historical trajectory of the construction of political and state order in Cameroon, have reproduced certain authoritarian modes of governance 'by fear' through acts of unprecedented violence, kidnappings, threats against populations defying the 'ghost towns', or the banning of pupils and students from going to school or university. The social psychosis has been further accentuated by the capacity of separatist armed groups to test the defence and security apparatus of the state through targeted attacks, but also the destruction of public buildings, hostage-taking for ransom, kidnapping of humanitarian personnel, looting, extortion and torture.

Also, the atrocious murders of certain elements of the defence and security forces or public administration officials, through their symbolic charge and the psychological impact of distrust of the state, were committed with a view to dissuading anyone who dared to go against the separatist vision conveyed by the armed groups. Since the beginning of the crisis in 2016⁶⁷ more than 3,000 civilians and hundreds of security force personnel have been killed in the English-speaking regions, with some over 1.5 million refugees.⁶⁸

Since the arrival of armed groups, there has been a symbolic competition within the public space between a governmental discourse centred around the "one and indivisible Cameroon" notion and a discourse convened by the armed insurgent and separatist groups. The propensity of these groups to win the hearts and minds of the greatest number is not to be taken lightly.

The data created by (ACLED) **Figure 1** attributes most incidents and attacks to separatist movements




66 Europe 1: Ambazonia declares its independence, 03/11/2017 on <https://www.europe1.fr/emissions/le-journal-du-monde/lambazonie-declare-son-independance-3453740> consulted on 07/06/2020, at 11am

67 TV5 monde: Exclusive document: Le poulx de l'Ambazonie, région anglophone du Cameroun en crise, 12/06/2018,, <https://www.hrw.org/fr/world-report/2020/country-chapters/336595> consulté le 10/06/2020

68 Human Rights Watch Report, Cameroon 2019 Events, <https://www.hrw.org/fr/world-report/2020/country-chapters/336595> accessed 10/06/2020

Figure 2, illustrates the magnitude of deaths associated with separatist groups



As a matter of fact, one of their members in an interview with France24 stated, "this is the flag of the former English-speaking territory in Cameroon, I respect it very much and I have it in every corner of my house... it is the symbol of a new country, Ambazonia. It is the flag that makes us so patriotic. We must have our own army which should take care of all our affairs...we still have the Republic of Cameroon on our territory, we must imagine all the possibilities to chase them away from our territory, so that we can manage our economy, run our administrations, and take care of our own affairs"⁶⁹.

Moreover, the armed groups in their quest to communicate their separatist vision to the population have their claims centred around the accentuation of social inequality and mistrust of government institutions, which have become incapable of ensuring the minimum needs of the population in terms of security, representation (democracy, respect for rights and freedoms, etc.)⁷⁰ and social comfort (food, health, and education needs). In the event of non-compliance, attacks are now carried out against the population, spawning panic within the communities that have become the main hostages. The reflection of this new warlike confrontation has led to the disassociation of many supporters and lobbyists who feel that they "no longer identify with the fight led by the separatists, who have become predators for their own families"⁷¹.

For some, the use of force by the state and the separatist movements justifies the accentuated radicalism of the separatist groups and the criticism of the Great National Dialogue. Human Right Watch asserts that the use of violence by the government and separatist groups has resulted in mass deaths on both sides and a decline in human rights and universal freedoms⁷². The recurrence of the threats and violence carried out by the separatists, their exclusion from the Grand Dialogue and the rejection of the proposals presented at this event are proof that the dialogue conducted has not had the desired impact.

The vision of the armed groups seems to be permanent despite the GND materialising. As far as their leaders are concerned, the granting of a special status to these two regions does not seem to meet the expectations of the separatist movements, who demand a de facto partition. As such, the special status according to Ebenezer Akwanga, leader of one of the separatist groups, would serve no purpose stating, "we are not part of Cameroon, Ambazonia is marching towards freedom and nothing can stop us"⁷³.

Similarly, some analysts believe that the issue of federalism was totally ignored during the dialogue. Like Edith Kah Wallah, leader of the Cameroon People's Party, they see in it the government's willingness to remain silent on the subject, which remains the crux of the crisis, because "the content of the dialogue was not negotiated. It was imposed by the regime"⁷⁴. It appears that the symbolic competition and violence to win the hearts and minds of the greatest number of people remains topical and that the obsession of the public authorities to ensure that the vision of "one and indivisible Cameroon", the basis for living together, still structures collective representations and perceptions. Also, the separatist option anchored on certain frustrations, social inequalities, etc. is not a relevant alternative.

⁶⁹ France 24: Cameroun: l'Ambazonie, la République fantasmée des séparatistes anglophones, 16/10/2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hjw2J9X_Jd8 consulté le 07/06/2020, at 8 pm

⁷⁰ Several actors agree that the crisis could have been avoided from the outset if the government had listened and taken concrete measures to address the trade unionist social demands made by teachers, followed by lawyers and young students. Its brutal methods in response to these non-violent actions led to the situation being inflamed. Read: Les Racines historiques de la crise anglophone, Edilivres, Sintiche Nahomie Pagnou Tchinda, 27/02/2020.

⁷¹ Online interview with someone close to the separatist elements in the field, Montreal May 10, 2020, 8pm.

⁷² Human Rights watch, Op.cit.

⁷³ Ibid

⁷⁴ Africanews: Cameroun: les recommandations du Grand dialogue rejetées par les chefs séparatistes, 04/10/2019, accessed 27/05/2020 on <https://fr.africanews.com/2019/10/04/cameroun-les-recommandations-du-grand-dialogue-rejetees-p>



Photo from *bbc.com*

CONCLUSION

Generally speaking, the September-October 2019 dialogue due to its structure, timing and also the established absence of some protagonists, did not seem to have achieved the desired impact. In order for a dialogue process to be effective, it is important that external and non-external support be able to respond concretely and sustainably to the concerns of the population. The arguments for marginalisation should therefore not be underestimated. The prevention of violent conflict requires that societies be able to address the root causes of conflict such as poverty, inequality and patterns of discrimination or social exclusion. Far from justifying the violence perpetrated by separatist movements, it would be important for governments to consider forms of response other than violent or armed modes of action, which tend to call into question their willingness to genuinely end the crisis. The denial of economic, political, and social marginalization should be abandoned by the Government and a genuine inclusive dialogue considered.

The word dialogue comes from the Greek derivative *dialogos*; (*dia*) the word and (*logos*) literally. It can therefore describe any communication that uses words to convey meaning. However, the term has come to refer to a specific form of participatory process – as used in the public

sphere during the post-Cold War era – which is especially well suited to meet social needs⁷⁵. A genuine dialogue for practitioners is one that “promotes improvement, understanding and interaction between people who are in conflict or who have a different approach to a problem”. Dialogue is not aimed at finding immediate solutions, but at generating positive results through communicating and listening to each other. Here, it is necessary to be able to recognise that the parties in conflict may have different perceptions and to commit to finding an outcome that is favourable to all. A well conducted dialogue, according to human rights and humanitarian practitioners, leads to better negotiation and a peaceful political process.

According to Women Informal Globalizing and Mobilizing (WIEGO), dialogue is not a mass meeting, an event controlled by a single interest group, an event that straddles formalities and protocols, a seminar or conference, a forum for communicating research results to the public, an opportunity to present pre-prepared resolutions or an ultimatum, a meeting organised on the spur of the moment⁷⁶. Within the context of the Great National Dialogue, the aforementioned elements of the structure and timeframe, the ability to domesticate, and above all the international pressure on crisis management, etc., had a considerable impact on the outcome of this Dialogue, making it not only difficult for ALL actors to participate, but also to discuss in an objective manner.

True dialogue takes place when the parties in conflict articulate and recognise common goals and concerns, i.e.:

- Recognise different perspectives;
- Recognise unequal power relations;
- Understand that each interest group can expect to lose ground and gain ground⁷⁷.

A well-structured dialogue can be a powerful platform for advocating for a return to peace. The government of Cameroon should consider the path of true reconciliation with the sons and daughters of the North-West and South-West regions beyond dialogue. This requires:

- A comprehensive and inclusive process, including key instruments such as justice, truth, reparation, etc. that enable the transition from a divided past to a common future. This reconciliation is long term and should help to replace the ‘fear’ with ‘non-violent coexistence’.

⁷⁵ Bettye Pruitt and Philip Thomas, *Democratic Dialogue - A Handbook for Practitioners*, P.19.

⁷⁶ Women informal globalizing and mobilizing (WIEGO) *Conducting a policy dialogue that delivers results*, July 2013, P.1.

⁷⁷ Ibid

- Establish the lost trust between the administrative authorities and the population.
- Work to develop empathy through recognition of the suffering caused by the aggressors precisely (separatists, armed forces), as well as populations of other regions in the country.
- Upholding truth as a precondition for reconciliation, creating the objective circumstances for people to see the past in terms of shared suffering and collective responsibility .
- This process must take place in a climate of peace leading to the protection of rights and the political commitment of all actors.
- Reconciliation must be driven within and by the whole of society. This requires the participation of all the actors in the crisis, each of whom has their own traditional or modern experience of conflict transformation and resolution. This approach makes it possible to break with the effects that a centralised dialogue guaranteed by the current power structure could have. No least of all, it is also an opportunity for all social actors to work together in a constructive, inter-relational manner to find a lasting and concrete solution capable of reinforcing and consolidating the sense of nationality and the State's sovereignty. More than a year after the convocation by the Head of State on 10 September 2019, we have considered it valid to challenge the Grand National Dialogue as a mechanism of domestication, de-internationalization of the crisis, political communication and a catalyst for values shared by the government and groups with separatist ambitions.

As regards the mobilisation and steps adopted to this effect, it was noted that the Dialogue in its role as a framework for understanding the situation in the North-West and South-West regions, with a view to better understanding it, made it possible over a few days to bring into coherence the ambiguous interpretation of the crisis in a Cameroonian public space that is constantly changing. This symbolic and public forum was, therefore, a real opportunity to find ways for a permanent return to peace and security – the foundations of stability and prosperity in Cameroon – in the attempt to address the security crisis in the North-West and South-West.

In this way, across a space-time continuum, the relevance of GND from a public policy point of view is expressed through the dynamics of problem construction within the public space, of competition and complementarity of the actors in order to make their values flourish on the form of the State, the model of governance. It is around the republican values of "one and indivisible Cameroon" and "Living Together", that the governmental discourse will be constructed and the actions of the State deployed (decentralised public governance, Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration, Presidential Reconstruction Plan, etc.), with a view to resolving the crisis in a sustainable manner. With respect to armed groups, the secessionist claim linked to unprecedented violence on the ground has made it possible to convince a few, either through fear or conviction.

Moreover, the process of setting the agenda for the North-West and South-West illustrates the diverse and multifaceted involvement of certain citizens in the management of public affairs. This mutual contribution of actors to the state issue is embodied in symbolic violence by both the public authorities and the separatist armed groups, whose psychologically highly charged strategies and methods of action are likely to win hearts and minds. The political, economic, social, and even psychological stakes of the Anglophone crisis remain topical. With regard to the unique historical trajectory of the North-West and South-West regions, the absolute imperative lies in the preservation of peace and security, specifically through a greater consideration of their socio-cultural heritage through effective decentralised public governance on one hand. And on the other hand, the reaffirmation of the "bilingual" and "bicultural" character of the country, which is the foundation of social and national cohesion and coexistence in Cameroon.

The differences between the separatists and the Government of the Republic of Cameroon could not be based on "a territory established by foreign powers in the absence of both parties" or on "a territory that was divided into two zones of unequal size, always by virtue of treaties between foreign powers to which we were not parties"⁷⁸. Security situations led by the entrepreneurs of violence and insecurity (separatist groups) in the North-West and South-West regions since 2016 have led to a "State crisis", specifically in the State's capacity to ensure the security of goods and people. Moreover, it has contributed to a depreciation of the authority of the state in its regions and a weakening of its strategic and organizational capacities.

⁷⁸ See Rapport Grand Dialogue, Op.cit; P. 4.



Photo by: Stringer/AFP via gettyimages

The reference to the "one and indivisible" sovereignty of Cameroon, which alone retains "the monopoly of legitimate violence" in its territory, illustrates the need for the state to reclaim control of its entire territory and secure areas under the control of separatist movements. Security, from a realistic point of view, can be understood as a "concept of interest defined in terms of power"⁷⁹. In this perspective, state security is part of a philosophical production and simultaneously includes a 'normative element' and a 'theoretical element' in terms of "political realism"⁸⁰ according to a naturalistic and realistic vision of authors such as Thomas Hobbes, Machiavelli, Hans Morgenthau, etc.

These authors ultimately recall that the state, alone in its organisational vision of its territory, with the exclusive jurisdiction over human and material competencies, holds the monopoly of legitimate security services⁸¹ capable of ensuring or restoring peace. This would mean that security comes from the field of sovereignty – from the state's supreme authority – rather than from the efficacy of the State's mechanisms in legitimizing and controlling the practice of organized violence⁸².

Hence, the need for a historic and reminiscence duty. The crisis will continue in the North-West and South-West or elsewhere for as long as Cameroon and Cameroonians reject their common history. The path to reconciliation and a return to peace requires the development of a spirit of

compromise and the need to set up a pragmatic approach that favours the adoption of concrete and realistic solutions that should lead to inclusive community development. In this, peace and security are seen as a common and national public good. Indeed, there is no development without security and no security without development.

In the end, this study should be a pretext to finding out how to compare the pros and cons of reactive and proactive conflict prevention, which is a prerequisite for the establishment of a Conflict Impact Assessment System (CIAS) in Africa and its complementary tool, the Conflict Assessment Tool (CAST). This system has three objectives: Firstly, enable decision-makers to anticipate both the positive and negative effects of their option or projects on conflict dynamics. Secondly, contribute to the development of a more coherent peace-building agenda, and finally, make policies for sustainable conflict management more "cost-effective".

⁷⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Jun., 1949), pp. 290-292.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Yves-Alexandre CHOUALA, *conjoncture sécuritaire, champ étatique et ordre politique au Cameroun: éléments d'analyse anthropo-politique d'une crise de l'encadrement sécuritaire et d'un encadrement sécuritaire de crise*, Polis / R.C.S.P. / C.P.S.R. Vol. 8, Special Edition, 2001, P2.

⁸² Ibid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Laws

Law n°96/06 of January 18, 1996 to amend the June 2, 1972 Constitution, amended and supplemented by Law n°2008/001 of April 14, 2008.

Law n° 2004/017 of July 22, 2004 on the orientation of decentralisation

Law n°2004/018 of July 22, 2004 fixing the rules applicable to municipalities.

Law n°2004/019 of July 22, 2004 laying down the rules applicable to the regions.

Law n° 2006/005 of July 14, 2006 fixing the conditions for the election of senators.

The Law n°2006/004 of July 14, 2006 fixing the mode of election of regional councillors.

Law N°2009/11 of 10 July 2009 on the financial regime of decentralised authorities.

Law n°2009/019 of December 15, 2009 on local taxation; Decree n°2010/1735/PM of June 1, 2010 fixing the budgetary nomenclature of decentralised local authorities.

Speech

Statement delivered by the English-speaking Congress at its 1 Buea meeting on April 2 & 3, 1993.

Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon, the Head of State's address to the Nation on September 10, 2019.

Books

ABE C., "Espace public et recompositions de la pratique politique au Cameroun", Polis/R.C.S.P. /C.P.S.R.Vol. 13, Issue numbers 1 - 2, 2006.

Betty Pruitt and Philip Thomas, *Democratic Dialogue - A Handbook for Practitioners*.

Bourdieu Pierre. Social capital. In: *Proceedings of social science research*. Vol.31, January 1980.

Braud, Philippe, *Sociologie politique*, 11th Edition, Paris, LGDJ, 2014.

Burno Tertrais, *La revanche de l'histoire*, Odile Jacobs, 2017.

Fernand Braudel, *Les ambitions de l'histoire*, published by Fallois/Paperback, 1997.

Foucault Michel, 2013, *La société punitive : cours au Collège de France, 1972-1973*, Paris, France, EHESS/Gallimard/Seuil.

G.Chaliand, *Anthologie mondiale de la stratégie : des origines au nucléaire*, Robert Laffont, 1990, PP.XVIII-XIV.

Garraud P., "Politiques nationales : l'élaboration de l'agenda, *L'Année sociologique*", 1990.

IDEA International Institute for Democracy and International Assistance, Stockholm, Suede, 2004.

Jean-François B., *L'Etat au Cameroun*, Paris, The National Political Science Foundation Press, 1979.

Muller P., *Les politiques publiques, Que Sais-je*, Second Edition, PUF, 2004.

Sindjoun Luc, *L'État ailleurs. Entre noyau dur et case vide*, Paris, Economica, 2002.

Sintiche Nahomie Pagnou Tchinda, *Les Racines historiques de la crise anglophone*, Edilivres, 27/02/2020.

Touoyem P., *Genre et gestion durable des conflits en Afrique. Esquisse de construction d'un paradigme endogène de la paix*. EUE, Tilburg, 2019. 347 pages.

Touoyem P., *Dynamiques de l'ethnicité en Afrique. Éléments pour une théorie de l'Etat multi-national*, CEA Leiden, 2014, 359 pages.

Touoyem P., *Afriques rebelles. Notes critiques sur l'ingénierie de paix et sécurité de l'Union africaine*, Editions Quest, Leiden, 399 pages.

Touoyem P., *Conjoncture sécuritaire en zone frontalière Tchad, Cameroun, République centrafricaine. Éléments d'analyse anthropo-politiste du phénomène des coupeurs de route*, SIPRI Edition, Stockholm, 2011.

Articles

Lorini E., Demolombe R., "From binary trust to graded trust in information sources: A logical perspective", *LNAI 5396*, 2008.

Fred Eboko and Patrick Awondo, *L'État stationnaire, entre chaos et renaissance*, *Politique africaine* 2018/2 (n°150).

HansJ .Morgentahau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Vol.64, No. 2 (Jun., 1949).

Hilgartner S. & Bosk C., 1988, "The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public Arena Model", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 94, No. 1.

Kingdon J., *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*, Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1984.

Knoepfel, P., Larrue, C., and Varone F., *Mise à l'agenda politique. Analyse et pilotage des politiques publiques*, Geneva: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 2001.

Les usages du temps dans les *Écrits sur l'histoire* de Fernand Braudel, *Revue d'Histoire* du XIX^{ème} siècle.

Grandisson T., Sloman M., "A survey of trust in internet applications. Communications Surveys & Tutorials", IEEE, vol. 3, no 4, 2000.

Veldhuis, T. & Staun, J., *Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model*, The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael. 2004.

Women informal globalizing and mobilizing (WIEGO) Conducting a policy dialogue for results, July 2013.

Wullson MVOMO ELA, "Contribution des Forces de Défense et de Sécurité dans la résolution des crises internes au Cameroun", *Honneur et fidélité*, December 2019.

Yvan ISSEKIN, *Localiser le refus de la sécession à Yaoundé : jeux et enjeux du meeting parlementaire de soutien pour la paix et l'indivisibilité du Cameroun* du 1er octobre 2017, *L'Espace politique*, Issue Number 35, 2017.

Yves-Alexandre CHOUALA, *Conjoncture sécuritaire, champ étatique et ordre politique au Cameroun : éléments d'analyse anthropo-politiste d'une crise de l'encadrement sécuritaire et d'un encadrement sécuritaire de crise*, Polis/R.C.S.P./C.P.S.R.Vol.8, Numéro Spécial, 2001.

Reports

Cluster World Health Organization, North-West and South-West, Health Cluster Update, 19 May - 03 June 2020 - Bulletin #06 <https://reliefweb.int/report/cameroon/cameroon-north-west-and-south-west-health-cluster-update-19-may-03-june-2020-0>.

Cynthia Petrigh *Le conflit anglophone au Cameroun Un dialogue sans partenaires*, IFRI, Octobre 2019, <https://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/notes-de-lifri/conflit-anglophone-cameroun-un-dialogue-partenaires>.

Grand Dialogue National *Vivre ensemble dans la PAIX* Palais des Congrès de Yaoundé, 30 septembre au 04 octobre 2019, <https://nationaldialogue.cm/fr/>

Rapport Human Rights Watch, Cameroun événements de 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/fr/world-report/2020/country-chapters/336595> consulté le 10/06/2020.

UNHCR Westand Central Africa, January 2020, <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/unhcr-west-and-central-africa-update-january2020>

Webography

<https://actu cameroun.com/2020/05/22/unite-nationale-au-cameroun-la-malediction-tribale/>

<http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20191213-crise-cameroun-anglophone-onu-fait-le-point-dernieres-avancees>

<https://afrique.le360.ma/autres-pays/politique/2020/03/06/29714-cameroun-crise-anglophone-la-russie-prone-la-non-ingerence-29714>

<https://journals.openedition.org/rh19/419> consulté le 15/06/2020

<https://www.investiraucameroun.com/gestion-publique/1312-13756-le-contenu-du-statut-special-accorde-aux-regions-anglophones-du-cameroun-soumis-a-la-validation-du-parlement>

https://www.minepat.gov.cm/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=584:reconstruction-du-Nord-Ouest-et-du-Sud-Ouest-le-gouvernement-mobilise-8-9-milliards-pour-le-lancement-du-plan-presidentiel&catid=24&lang=fr&Itemid=144

<https://les-yeux-du-monde.fr/actualite/actualite-analysee/41928-crisecamerounanglophone-echec-grand-dialogue-national>

<http://www.theworldcafe.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/sofdownload1.pdf>

<https://journals.openedition.org/espacepolitique/5275#authors>

<https://www.prc.cm/fr/actualites/discours/3776-message-du-chef-de-l-etat-a-la-nation>

<https://www.camerounweb.com/CameroonHomePage/NewsArchive/Ind-pendance-de-l-Ambazonie-l-int-gral-discours-de-Ayuk-Tabé-en-2017-Retro-447682>

<https://www.facebook.com/ambacoins/videos/2519904321400039>

<http://www.politiqueaine.com/numes/pdf/051139.pdf>

<https://www.europe1.fr/emissions/le-journal-du-monde/lambazonie-declare-son-independance-3453740>, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hjw2J9X_Jd8

<https://fr.africanews.com/2019/10/04/cameroun-les-recommandations-du-grand-dialogue-rejetees-par-les-chefs-separatiste>

